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TESTIMONY OF PARTIES IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE APPLETO,

of Maine, under date of Feb-

ruary 22d 1865, wrote a letter to the Hon. D. E. Ware, of
Boston, which appeared in the Register of August following,
wherein he states that the legislature of Maine in 1859 passed an
act by which any respondent in any criminal prosecution for
"libel, nuisance, simple assault, assault and battery," might, by
- offering himself as a witness, be admitted to testify. And that,
'in 1863, the law as to admission of testimony was further extended,
and it was enacted, that, "in the trial of any indictments, complaints, and other proceedings against persons charged with the
commission of crimes or offences, the person so charged shall at
his own request, and not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness: the credit to be given to his testimony being left solely to
the jury, under the instructions of the court."
Chief Justice APPLETON also wrote a second letter, bearing

date the 24th of February 1866, to John Q. Adams, Esq., Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of Massachusetts (vide
Law Register for October last), wherein he gives his views at
length upon the change in criminal evidence, and argues with
much legal acumen and plausibility, the justice of the new law in
his state. The opinion emanating from a gentleman who has
made the subject of evidence a specialty for many years, demands
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at least a candid consideration by the profession, and all who
desire the administration of equity and justice.
As the suggestion of th6 Chief Justice was adopted by the Judiciary Committee and reported to the House of Reproesentatives,
in the form of a bill, and which may, from present appearances,
become a law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, it is desirable that the question be fully discussed and digested, and we
therefore deem it not ill-timed to offer a few reasons why, in our
opinion, the establishment of such rule would not only fail to
.prove practicable, but be far from subserving the public good.
The proposed rule as yet being almost wholly untried, can be
argued only upon general principles of propriety.
The honorable advocate of the change .concedes the principle
of evidence, that the accused is deemed innocent, and all trials
for crime proceed with that presumption. 11Yet during the trial,"
he observes, in speaking of the established rule, " when the question of guilt or innocence is to be determined, the party injured
* or alleging he is injured, is admitted t testify, while the respon4ent, presumed innocent, is denied a hearing. Audi alteram
partem. Hearing botlf sides of a controversy is so obvious a
dictate of impartial justice, that one may well marvel that its
wisdim and propriety should, ever ht% .been called in question,
much more that it should have been denied."
It may be observed here, that one of the principles upon which

the rule of law disallowing .a party in .criminal proceedings to
testify, is, it redounds to 'the benefit of the accused and thus
carries out the fundamental legal presumption of inn'ocence.
The guiltless is thus protected. Taking into consideration the
overwhelming shock, which a man of nervous and delicate sensibilities -must realize upon being arraigned for some heinous
crime, before a judge, perhaps, who has. the reputation of being
not only severe in his manner of trying a case, but unmerciful
in convicting and passing sentence; and considering, also, the
liability of such person being not only overcome, and therefore
incoherent in his testimony, but of actually criminating -himself,
the rule can but work great hurt and injustice. The human mind,
under the pressure of calamity, is easily seduced, and liable, in'
the alarm of. danger, to acknowledge indiscriminately a falsehood
or a truth, as different agitation may prevail. Taking advantage
of his confusion, in the cross-examination, subtle or designing
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counsel might make out a much stronger case than if the party
had not testified; as was found to be the injurious result of the
rule in Connecticut. And the honorable gentleman admits that
he has known cases where, notwithstanding the innocence of the
prisoner, " as was abundantly proved," and wotwitkstanding his
own testimony, tite jyry found him guilty. Our time-honored
and time-tried rule, therefore, upon this showing and aspect of
the case, may be said to be wiser and safer for the accused (and
that is the aim of the law), in the majority of cases, than by the
rule adopted in Maine.
. Although in France, and some other countries, the accused is
allowed to testify, yet in England for centuries, going back before
William of Normandy conquered that island, the rule of the common law has been adhered to and been found to subserve justice.
The rule has obtained time out of mind.
The Chief Justice admits, that when the accused is permitted
to testify he will be pressed With question upon question, and that
evasion would be suspicious, and silence be tantamount to confession. "All this," he remarks, "may be disastrous to the
criminal$ but justice is done." We would ask wherein ? If disastrous to the party arliaigned, how is justice done ? It would
assuredly be disastrous to the accused, and justice would not
certainly be done if the party being allowed to testify should tell
.such a confused, incoherent story (as is usual with an ignorant
person in such cases), through embarrassment and fright (as it is
with those who, circulating in good society, are arraigned for
crime), that the minds of the jury would take his incomprehensible answers as evasions, and his testimony, in the main, as
implicating and condemning himself. Nothing could be said of
avail in palliation of his conduct. And how often do we see
instances, even in civil matters, where men cannot make a statement on the stand, with clearness en6ugh to be understood by a
lawyer, much less by those who comprise an average panel of
jurymen; and how much more is this confusion and incoherency
aggravated naturally, in criminal cases, thus militating in an
incalculable degree against the prisoner. And it is fair to presume, a man having the right to be heard, whether innocent or
guilty, if he remains silent the suspicions of the jury would at
once be keenly aroused.
These we deem cogent reasons why it is safer, and wherein
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justice will be administered and subserved better, by not allowing
parties to be heard in their own defence. The same objections
cannot, of course, be equally pertinent in civil cases. We do not,
therefore, agree with our advocate, in thinking that the guilty
would be "less likely to escape," or the danger of unjust convicFor the history of criminal
tion of the innocent "diminished."
law proves, the guilty person, having committed a crime, steels
his mind and heart to the "sticking-point," and never fails to tell
a plausible story; while the innocent usually breaks down under
-the rigid, perhaps confounding examination.
The time-honored maxim, Stare decisis et non quieta movere,
has been revered in all ages as the bulwark of safety in jurispru.dence. And while we are not among those who cry out Stare
decisis! (with af much emphasis as the elder' Cato ejaculated
.Delendaest Carthago,on all occasions) whenever a reform in law
is proposed, and not unmindful that society is constantly being
educated, growing in truth-yet, we hold the. reform, or rather
change in the Code of Maine, to be too radical, untimely, and we
can but predict a speedy repeal of the law, as was done in Connecticut. And thus we essay to take issue with the Chief Justice,
and against any state adopting said rule for these obvious
reasons.
To wisely prune and graft the law has in every age been considered beneficial ; but true reform, since the Spartan lawgiver's
time, has never been accomplished by ploughing too deeply or
planting too abundantly. For as the prince of reformers, Bacon,
somewhere remarks, "The work which I propound, .tendeth to
pruning .and grafting the law, and not to ploughing up and plantifig it again: for such a remove I should hold indeed for a
perilous"innovati02s."
And thus to plough up the prime root antl element in criminal
jurisprudence, which is made the more worthy of veneration from
its duration and time-tried wisdom, would indeed be perilous.
And Lord Erskine thus eloquently and eulogistically says of evidence: "The principles of the Law of Evidence are founded in
the charities of religion-in the philosophy of nature-in" the
truths of history, and in the experience of common life :" 24
Howell's State Trials 966. And likewise observes Chief Justice
STORY, in the case of MichoI8 v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326-832:
"The rules of evidence are of great importance, and cannot be

In CRIMI-AL PROSECUTIONS.

departed from without endangering private as vell as publie
rights.,"
It is peculiarly fitting to consider and ponder these wise opinions, when a proposition is made to undermine and overthrow a
charitable rule of law, whereof the mind of man runneth not td
the contrary.
Some jurists have held, that confessioti alone is a sufficient
ground for conviction, even in the absence of independent evidence: Best on Pres. p. 330, and cases there cited.
But by the established law of England, a voluntary and unsuspected confession is not sufficient to warrant conviction, unless
there is independent proof of the eorpus delicti. This rule is
certainly more in accordance with the principles of reason and
justice. Those who would hold a confession competent for conviction, would doubtless' advocate the rule which is adopted in
Maine. The voice, whether bold or timid, of the accused, would
doubtless turn the scale for conviction or acquittal, in the minds
of disciples of that school.
By an ordinance of France passed in 1667, the testimony of
relatives and allies of parties, even down to the children of second
cousins inclusively, is rejected in civil matters whether it be for
or against them. This tnstitution has in modern times, also,
been considered sound and reasonable: 1 Seld. 1497, Wilk. ed.
For it becomes not the law to administer any temptation to
-perjury. By the civil law relatives could not be compelled to
attest against those to whom they were allied. Thus showing
that fundamentally the law has not favored the testimony of prisoners, or of their friends and relatives.
The able and pointed contributor "B." in the Register of
January 1866, avers that it is owing to prejudice in the minds of
men, which prevents their acquiescence to give fair scope for the
experiment,-of allowing parties in qriminal prosecutions to testify ;-and states, that Connecticut having passed an act, wherein
the legislature inadvertently made the provision so broad as to
cover criminal proceedings, it was repealed from "1prejudice."
It is true, mankind arc naturally opposed to innovation, but especially so when it is aimed to root up a fundamental principle;
and, too, when the injustice and inequity of such innovation is
palpable, and been so proved to the satisfaction of a state or
people. In the state of Connecticut, where the "new rule" had
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a fair trial, it was found to work incalculable hurt to innocent
persons, for adroit and cunning lawyers were prone either to
hold up to the minds of the jury the fact-the astounding fact !that the prisoner at the bar had not testified as was his privilege,
or had evaded questions, and therefore suspicion should attach.
So that, whichever position the accused might assume, he placed
himself in a critical 'and unfavorable aspect. Like the very
ancient custom among the Romans, to prove a man's guilt, or
indebtedness, by the "1water-test"-if he floated he was guilty,
if he sunk he was innocent, so that he lost his life, 6r case, in
either event.
The contribution referred to by "1I. F. R." in his editorial
remarks upon C. 5. APPLETON'S Judiciary letter, aforementioned,
which was apparently written by an able member f the bar of Connecticut, says, in so many words, that ",prejudice had. nothing to
do with the repeal of the act (in that state), but that after one
year's trial, the impression with the profession and the judges
was, that mercy to the accused demanded its repeal." And then
proceeds to say, he thinks " those usually denominated criminal lawyers '* * * were loudest in'calling for a repeal of
the act." The repeal was therefore the result of one year's experiment, and not from mere " prejudice,* as charged in the January article referred to.
It was in the -early part of the session of the Connecticut
Legislature of 1848, that a bill, which was substantially drawn
by Judge McCURDY and introduced by the Hon. Charles Chapman, was passed in these words: " No person shall be disqualified
as a witness in any suit or proceeding at law or in equity, by
reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or
,otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of a crime; but such
interest or conviction may be shown for. the purpose of affecting
his credit."
The introducer of that bill informs the writer that it was not
intended to make a man indicted for crime a competent witness
in his own case, and that he presumes Judge McCuRDY had no
such purpose. At the first term of the Supreme Court after the
passage of the act, it may be seen, the presiding judge held-that,
by said law,'.he accused was made a competent witness, and the
decision was concurred in by all the judges:
At the following session of the legislature it was that an
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act was passed to the effect that, "so much of the 141-t section
of said act (it being the feature in question) as authorizes a party
to testify, regarding the same, be and is hereby repealed."
The presumption of law that an accused person is innocent
until proved guilty, becomes a mere mockery when such traps are'
set for guilty men as the one in Connecticut in 1848, and the one
now being used in the state of Maine.
It is a shameful fact that, practically, in Massachusetts and
Maine, every person arraigned for a criminal offence is presumed
to be guilty until he is proven innocent, in contradistinction to
the theory of the common law. If the rule advocated by Chief
Justice APPLETON were to become the law in Massachusetts, "it
would be the last turn in the screw," says our informant, "and
few men would ever after be successfully defended there." A
cross-examination of a person arraigned for crime*is indeed a terrible test, and the skilful trier who conducts it might well say
with Hamlet:" If circumstances lead me I will find
Where truth is hid, thdugh it were hid indeed
Within the centre."

We think it is abundantly shown, the trial of the rule in Connecticut proved-as doubtless will be proved in Maine-that innocent persons were more likely to be convicted thereby than under
.the old common-law rule of England. For it works in contravention
of the wise maxim in criminal law, that "it is better that ten
guilty persons should escape than that one innocent man should
suffer." A citation or two may not be ill-timed in this connection.
The notorious trial of Eugene Aram, which took place at the
York Assizes in 1759, is a strong case illustrative of our theorythat more certainty of conviction follows when the prisoner is
allowed to speak or testify. Readers of criminal law and history
will agree, that the testimony adducecl in Aram's Case was entirely
inadequate and insufficient to convict him.
The body of Daniel Clarke, the murdered man, was found in a
cave, fourteen years after the deed was committed. Richard
Houseman, who was indicted, turned "king's evidence," and
Aram was named as the principal perpetrator of the crime. The
skull of the murdered man was produced in court, but the only
medical testimony was that of Mr. Locock, who deposed, that
"no such breach as that pointed out in the skull could have pro-
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ceeded from natural decay ; that it was not a recent fracture by
the instrument with which it had been dug up, but seemed to be
The prosecution proved in fact
of many years' standing."
nothing; and Aram called no witness in his defence. The sage
principle in English law, that no man can be condemned for murder unless the body of the person supposed to have been murdered
be found and identified, was entirely ignored in this case ; the
corpus delicti was not proved; no satisfactory proof that the
skeleton was that of Clarke. Neither the age, the sex, nor any
of the many points of identity which at the present day would be
required, were proved.
Trusting to his genius, eloquence, and ingenuity for defence,
Aram delivered a written speech of great power, denying any
knowledge of the. bones exhibited, and presented weighty argument to prove they belonged to'some hermit who had in former
times dwelt in the cave, 1Cas the holy Saint Robert was known to
have done." Although Aram's argument was most powerful, the
jury failed to be convinced of his innocence. It is confidently
believed that the astonishing abilities he exhibited on his trial
contributed only to the clearer establishment of his guilt. The
celebrated Dr. Paley, who was present at the trial, was afterward
heard to say, that Eugene Aram had 'got himself hanged by his
own ingenuity." If he had remained silent the jury could not
have convicted him upon the evidence presented.
There is little doubt, from -different authorities on the subject,
that he unwittingly pleaded for his own conviction. He doubtless
did more to throw light (or what was considered light) upon the
gossamer-threaded evidence, and prove "unknown facts of guilty
acts," than a dozen witnesses. And it is conceded that the jury
not only, indulged in conjectures, and magnified suspicions into.
proofs, but weighed probabilities in goZd scales.
We have cited this case as tending to show that, when a prisoner undertakes to exculpate himself, the nature of man -issuch
that it begins to distrust and finally rebel against his words of
exculpation-even if the accused does not entangle himself in
some link or chain of the evidence, as is most likely to be the
case.

Other and. parallel cases might be cited to show that, when a
party in criminal prosecution speaks in his own behalf, he usually
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has "a fool for his client ;" and that it invariably fails, at least,
to improve his position before the court.
We conceive that, for any state to adopt the act or rule, which
Connecticut found unwise and impracticable and repealed-as
working great injustice to the innocent-which Maine has adopted;
and which is urged upon Massachusetts, would not only 'be a
"perilous innovation," but be instrumental in furthering the
acquittal of bold and desperately bad men, and convicting those
who are timid and wholly innocent.
Our time-revered rule not only obviates the possibility of the
accused criminating himself, but prevents perjury. And who can
doubt, if we were to adopt the proposed rule-this unhingement of
the law--in the state of New York, that persons guilty. of the crime
with which they are arraigned, would on every occasion commit
perjury; and whether they did or not, the jury would believe
they did, and so be loth to accredit the testimony of any one.
Thus, the rule would inevitably become an engine of self-conviction. The act of administering the oath to a prisoner, and likewise his testimony, would be deemed futile, idle words. At the
present time the accused is at liberty to say whatever he pleases
after the case is submitted, and his statements are taken for what
they are worth.
So that, under the old-established law, there is as much efficacy
in hearing the prisoner as there could possilbly be were the proposed rule adopted. And, finally, in all candor to Mr. Chief Justice
APPLETON and those who adhere to his school, we can only
account for their earnest advocacy, and the people's opposition
(where it has been tried) to the new rule, upon the principle of
the old proverb, that a looker-on seeth more than a gamester.
J. F. B.
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